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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/893,789	06/29/2001	Marcos Nogueira Novaes	YOR920010315US1	4577
48150 7	590 12/07/2006		EXAMINER	
MCGINN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP, PLLC 8321 OLD COURTHOUSE ROAD			LY, ANH	
SUITE 200	OKTHOUSE KOMD		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
VIENNA, VA 22182-3817			2162	

DATE MAILED: 12/07/2006

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	
09/893,789	NOVAES, MARCOS NOGUEIRA	
Examiner	Art Unit	
Anh Ly	2162	

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The MAILING DATE of this communication app	ears on the cover sheet with the	correspondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED 29 November 2006 FAILS TO PLACE TH		•	
 The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or this application, applicant must timely file one of the followances the application in condition for allowance; (2) a N (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in comfollowing time periods: 	on the same day as filing a Notice of lowing replies: (1) an amendment, a Notice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in pliance with 37 CFR 1.114. The rep	of Appeal. To avoid ab affidavit, or other evide compliance with 37 (ence, which CFR 41.31; or
 a) The period for reply expires months from the mailing b) Z b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Accevent, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later to Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b) 	lvisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in th han SIX MONTHS from the mailing date o	f the final rejection.	
MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07 Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date of been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened sabove, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months.	(f). n which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a and the corresponding amount of the fee. statutory period for reply originally set in the	a) and the appropriate extensions The appropriate extensions final Office action; or (2)	ension fee have on fee under 37 as set forth in (b)
earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	•	•	
 The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in confiling the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any Since a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must <u>AMENDMENTS</u> 	extension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to avoid dismissal o	of the appeal.
3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection (a) They raise new issues that would require further c (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE bel	onsideration and/or search (see NC ow);	TE below);	
 (c) They are not deemed to place the application in beappeal; and/or (d) They present additional claims without canceling and the second second			the issues for
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).		
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):		
6. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be the non-allowable claim(s).			
7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a how the new or amended claims would be rejected is proposed. The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed:) [_] will not be entered, or b) [_] wovided below or appended.	vill be entered and an	explanation of
Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected:			
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			•
8. The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, I because applicant failed to provide a showing of good a and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).	nd sufficient reasons why the affida	vit or other evidence i	s necessary
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary.	overcome <u>all</u> rejections under appeary and was not earlier presented.	al and/or appellant fa See 37 CFR 41.33(d)(ils to provide a 1).
10. The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanati REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	on of the status of the claims after of	entry is below or attac	ched.
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered be See Continuation Sheet.		n condition for allowa	nce because:
 Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s) Other:). (PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)	_	
73. [_] Other:	John	N BREENE PATENT EXAMINER ON CENTER 2100	
	SUPERVISURY	GY CENTER 2100	
S. Patent and Trademark Office	I E OTHER		

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office PTOL-303 (Rev. 08-06)

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

Examiner maintains the rejection.

Applicants argued that, "The Examination Guidelines state that ... It is noted that the Guidelines do not constitute substative reulemaking and hence do not have the force and effect of law." (page 6, lines 10-14).

The Guidelines have been incorporated into the MPEP 2106.

Claims 2-17, 22, 24-39, 44, 45 and 47-51 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the bodies of independent claims of those claims in view of MPEP 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(ii) sections are non statutory because they are lacking of real world useful result. They are missing the steps or processes producing any useful result to the invention, of having a utility to convey the final result achieved by the claimed invention, that is, they are not producing a result tied to the real/physical world or this application is not a practical application. The claims lack the necessary physical articles or objects to constitute a machine or a manufacture within the meaning of 35 USC 101. They are clearly not a series of steps or act to be a process nor are they a combination of chemical compounds to be a composition of matter. As such, they fail to fall within a statutory category. They are, at best, functional descriptive material per se.

Descriptive material can be characterized as either "functional descriptive material" or "nonfunctional descriptive material." Both types of "descriptive material" are nonstatutory when claimed as descriptive material per se, 33 F.3d at 1360, 31 USPQ2d at 1759. When functional descriptive material is recorded on some computer-readable medium, it becomes structurally and functionally interrelated to the medium and will be statutory in most cases since use of technology permits the function of the descriptive material to be realized. Compare In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84, 32 USPQ2d 1031, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1994)

Merely claiming nonfunctional descriptive material, i.e., abstract ideas, stored on a computer-readable medium, in a computer, or on an electromagnetic carrier signal, does not make it statutory. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185-86, 209 USPQ at 8 (noting that the claims for an algorithm in Benson were unpatentable as abstract ideas because "[t]he sole practical application of the algorithm was in connection with the programming of a general purpose computer.").

All claims have abstract idea, perform mathematical algorithm processes. These are non-statutory subject matters. (see MPEP 2106.02)

Applicants argued that, "claim 17, selectively traversable by using hypertext links and by not using hypertext links. The claim contains subject matter, which does not enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. "by using hypertext links and by not using hypertext links."

Applicants argued that, "it would not have been obvious to combine Fox and Egendorf." (page 20, lines 8-10; page 23, lines 1-8 and page 24, lines 1-6).

In response to applicant's argument that there is no suggestion to combine the references, the examiner recognizes that obviousness can only be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, Fox and Egendorf are from the same field of endeavor and both are directed to searching/retrieving relevant document and closer or affinity of words n the documents (Fox's abstract and section 0059, Egendorf's 0011-0014, 0026 & 0240). One having ordinary skill in the art would have found it motivated to combine the teachings of Fox and Egendorf because it motivated to utilize the use of traveling or traversing information to find out an affinity group the affinity as disclosed (Egendorf's section 0036 and 0060), into the system of Fox for the purpose of searching for information in a plurality of information sources and searching databases on the Internet, thereby, solving the problem of finding current information in an increasingly broad, large scale in the Internet network (Egendorf's sections 0001-0002 and 0052). Moreover, the examiner kindly submits that the applicants misread the applicable references used in the last office action. However, when read and analyzed in light the specification, the invention as claimed does not support applicant's assertions. Actually, applicants are interpreting the claims very narrow without considering the broad teaching of the references used in the rejections. Additionally, it is important to note that the examiner interpretation of the claims, wherein, the examiner explicitly stated passages in the cited references which were not even addressed. The aforementioned assertion wherein all the limitations are not taught or suggested by the prior of record, was unsupported by objective factual evidence and was not found to be substantial evidentiary value. The examiner has provided in the last office action, a convincing one of reasoning as to why the artisan would have found the claimed invention to have been obvious in light of the teachings of the cited references. Applicants are reminded that 37 CFR 1.111(b) states, a general allegation that the claims define a patentable invention without specifically printing out how the language of the claims patentably distinguishes them from the references does not comply with the requirements of this section. Therefore, the applicants have failed to provided prima facie evidence how the language of the claims patentably distinguished them from the cited references. Hence, the applicants' assertions are just mere allegation with no supported fact.

ME 12/05/06